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Abstract
This paper presents consideration of the effects of child allowances and subsidies for private ed-
ucation investment on fertility and private education investment. The level of public education
expenditure plays an important role in the effects of child care policies. To raise fertility, although
child allowances are effective in an economy with low public education investment, subsidies for ed-
ucation investment are effective in an economy for which public education investment is high. The
results presented in this paper are helpful for reconciling the conflicting results reported from previous
studies. In addition, this paper presents an examination of the effects of those child care policies on
pension benefits. A subsidy for private education can raise both fertility and pension benefits.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents an examination of the effects of child allowances and education subsidies on fertility
and education investment for children. In some economically developed countries, aging societies with
fewer children are progressing. 1 If fertility and human capital increase, then the effective labor supply
increases.
Fertility depends on the level of child care. As demonstrated by the experiences of U.K., France,
and Sweden, a high level of child care can bring about a high level of fertility. Education policy should
therefore be considered along with child care. If education costs are low, then parents can provide
education investment funds for their children. Consequently, human capital is accumulated to a greater
degree. Thereby, more wage income is obtainable. By virtue of their low education expenses, the parents
can have more children. Then, in general, a policy to decrease education costs such as education subsidies
and public education investment might have the same effect as a child allowance. The figure shows the
public education level, child care policy level, and fertility in some OECD countries. Results show that
high public education levels and high child care policy levels can bring about high fertility.
[Insert Fig. 1. around here.]
This paper presents a demonstration that the effectiveness of child care policies depends on the level of
public education investment. In the economy with low public education investment, the child allowances
can raise fertility. In contrast, subsidies for private education investment are effective for raising fertility
in an economy with high public education investment. With respect to the effects of child allowances
and education subsidies on fertility, as noted below, conflicting results have been obtained from related
studies. The model of this paper can explain the conflicting results reported in the relevant literature.
Many studies in this field examine child-care policies using an endogenous fertility model. van Groezen,
Leers and Meijdam (2003), Yasuoka and Goto (2011), and others report that child allowances can raise
fertility. These studies emphasize the positive effect of child allowances on fertility.2 However, Fanti and
Gori (2009) show a negative effect of a child allowance.3
In the model of quality and quantity of children as an education investment for children, Becker
1The share of older people (over 65 years old) among all people is 24.1% in Japan, 20.4% in Italy, 20.4% in Germany,
18.2% in Sweden, and 16.8% in France (Data: United Nations “World Population Prospects The 2010 Revision Population
Database,” Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications in Japan “Population Statics,” Cabinet Office, Government
of Japan “Decreasing Birthrate White Paper”).
2Sleebos (2003) reports not only that a child allowance as direct financial aid in cash but also child care services available
by avoiding quitting work to rear children are important to increase fertility. Apps and Rees (2004) and Ferrero and Iza
(2004) derive a positive correlation between fertility and the labor participation rate.
3Fanti and Gori (2009) assess taxation for children, which is negative child allowances and derives that the child tax can
raise the fertility. Substantially, this result demonstrates that child allowance policies reduce fertility.
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(1960), Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), Tamura (1994) and de la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004)
examine the mechanism involved in the tradeoff between the quality and quantity of children. The
tradeoff between the quality and quantity of children shows that if the relative education cost decreases,
then the parents raise the level of education investment for children. Then fertility decreases, and vice
versa.
Zhang (1997), Zhang and Casagrande (1998), and Yasuoka and Miyake (2014) use an endogenous
fertility model with human capital accumulation to assess effects of child care policies and education
subsidies. These studies consider the child care policy as a child allowance and education subsidy. These
policies affect the costs of quality and quantity of children and bring about a substitution between the
quality and quantity of children.
Zhang (1997) reports that an education subsidy raises education investment, but decreases fertility.
Chen (2014) sets an endogenous fertility model with occupational choice. In the model of Chen (2014),
education subsidy that decreases the cost to work as skilled labor increases not only the income level
but also the fertility. Yasuoka and Miyake (2014) demonstrate that an education subsidy can raise both
education investment and fertility because of rising pension benefits by virtue of the education subsidy.
As described in this paper, however, we examine whether the effects of education subsidies on fertility
depend on the level of public education investment.
Omori (2009) and Fanti and Gori (2011) show that it is not a policy to decrease child-care costs, such
as child allowances, but rather public education investment that can raise fertility and human capital
accumulation. However, the analyses described in this paper demonstrate that the effects of child care
policy depend on the level of public education investment. This aspect was not examined in earlier
studies.
Our paper includes the results obtained by the related researches. Zhang (1997) shows the positive
effect of child allowance on the fertility, however, Fanti and Gori (2009) shows the negative effect. Zhang
(1997) shows the negative effect of the subsidy for education on the fertility, however, Fanti and Gori
(2011) shows the positive effect. Our paper includes these results. That is, our model setting can derive
the positive and negative effect of child allowance and the subsidy for education on the fertility and the
education investment.
In addition, our paper derives whether the policy can raise the social welfare or not. The result
depends on the discount factor for each generation’s utility.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the model. Section 3 derives the
equilibrium and assesses the effect of child allowances and an educational subsidy. Section 4 presents an
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examination of how policies affect the pension benefit and social welfare. The final section concludes this
paper.
2 The Model
The model economy is based on a two-period (young and old) overlapping generations model with small
open. Households experience two periods: young and old. As assumed by Zhang (1997), de la Croix and
Doepke (2003) and others, households’ utility function ut is given as
ut = lnntht+1 + α ln ct+1, 0 < α. (1)
Households care for both the number nt and the quality ht+1 of their children as well as consumption
ct+1. In the equation, t represents the period.
During the young period, each household raises children and supplies labor to earn labor income.
This analysis assumes that it is necessary for households (parents) to input child-care services to have
children. Households have one unit of time and supply labor inelastically. The government provides a
pay-as-you-go pension system. In addition, the government imposes taxation on young households to
subsidize education or provide child allowances. Each household distributes its labor income into child-
care services, education for children, and consumption during the old period. Consequently, we obtain
the following budget constraint.
(zt − qt)nt + (1− xt)etnt + ct+11 + r = (1− γ − τ − θ)wht +
pt+1
1 + r
(2)
The model economy is assumed to be a small open economy. Given f(k) as neoclassical product function,
where f(k) and k denote output per capita and capital-labor ratio and assuming f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0, the
interest rate and wage rate are determined exogenously in competitive market, where r and w respectively
denote the interest rate and wage rate per unit of human capital ht. Moreover zt denotes the price of
child-care service; qt is the child allowance for one child. Therefore, parents with nt children receive child
allowances that are equal to qtnt. In addition, et denotes private education investment. The rate of
educational subsidy is given as xt. In addition, γ is the tax rate to subsidize child-care support policies.4
For these analyses, τ is the tax rate or contribution rate to provide pension benefits for older people. The
pension benefit for older people is pt+1. The tax rate to provide public education investment is θ.
Next, we consider human capital accumulation. The children’s human capital ht+1 depends on private
education investment et and public education investment vt according to the following accumulation
4This tax revenue is proportional to a wage income. However, this tax finance does not distort household decisions.
Fundamentally, this assumption is the same as that made by Zhang (1997).
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equation,5
ht+1 = βetv
1−
t , 0 <  < 1, β > 0. (3)
An individual chooses the level of consumption, number of children, and educational level to maximize
lifetime utility (1) subject to the lifetime budget constraint (2) and the equation of human capital accu-
mulation (3). The optimal allocations are determined as presented below
ct+1 =
α(1 + r)
1 + α
[
(1− τ − θ − γ)wht + pt+11 + r
]
, (4)
nt =
1− 
(zt − qt)(1 + α)
[
(1− τ − θ − γ)wht + pt+11 + r
]
, (5)
et =

1− 
zt − qt
1− xt . (6)
Next, we consider the child-care services market. Aggregate child-care services Yt are produced by
Yt = ρLct ; also, ρ > 0 and L
c
t denote the effective labor input for child-care services.
6 Denoting wct as the
wage rate of child-care service, the profit function pit is
pit = ztρLct − wctLct . (7)
Profit maximization reduces to zt =
wct
ρ inperfect competitive market. Assuming free labor mobility
between the final goods sector and the child-care service sector, the wage rate wct is given as wct = wht.
Consequently, we obtain zt = zˆwht, where zˆ = 1ρ .
We assume that each policy is financed by each taxation. The government imposes taxation at tax
rate γ to provide child allowances or to subsidize educational investment, τ to provide pension benefits
for older people, and θ to provide public education investment. Then, the government’s budget constraint
of child-care support policies is presented as
γwht = qˆwhtnt + xetnt, (8)
pt = τwnt−1ht, (9)
vt =
θwht
nt
. (10)
This model economy assumes qt = qˆwtht and xt = x. The child allowance qˆwtht is income-proportional to
provide a sufficient child allowance with income growth. Subsidy rates of a child allowance and education
5Some cases include the setting of human capital accumulation, as shown by Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and others.
Glomm and Kaganovich (2003) consider both public and private education investment, which are mutual substitutes. Omori
(2009) sets education investments of the two types and assumes private education investment as the parental education
time for their children. We can consider human capital accumulation (3). For instance, public education is regarded as an
elementary school or basic education step. This education step is set as a mandatory education process. Private education
is regarded as university or higher education.
6This function is assumed by Yasuoka and Miyake (2010) and Day (2012).
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are assumed to be 0 < qˆ < zˆ and 0 < x < 1. Given qˆ and x exogenously, γ is determined endogenously
to maintain a balanced budget (0 < γ).
Additionally, we consider the pension budget. Defining Nt as the population of the young generation
in period t, nt−1 ≡ NtNt−1 shows the intergenerational population ratio or population growth rate. Based
on a balanced budget, pension benefits for older people are shown by (9). With a balanced budget, public
education investment vt is provided by (10).
3 Effects of Child Care Policies
This section presents analysis of the effects of two child-care policies on the human-capital growth rate
and fertility: a child allowance (x = 0) and a subsidy for education investment for children (qˆ = 0).
3.1 Child Allowance
First, we examine how a child allowance affects fertility and human capital accumulation. If the govern-
ment provides a child allowance, then the government budget constraint (8) becomes
γwht = qˆwhtnt. (11)
Moreover, the human-capital growth rate 1 + g = ht+1ht and fertility n are shown as presented below
7
1 + g =
βw
1−  [(zˆ − qˆ)]

θ(1 + α) zˆ − qˆ − τ(1−)(1+g)(1+α)(1+r)
1− τ − θ − γ
1− , (12)
n =
(1− )(1− γ − τ − θ)
(1 + α)
[
zˆ − qˆ − 1−1+α τ(1+g)1+r
] . (13)
Total differentiation of (11) and (12) with respect to qˆ, γ, g at the approximation of qˆ = 0 provides the
effects of a child allowance on the growth rate as
dg
dqˆ
= −
(1 + g)
[

zˆ +
(
1 + 1−1+α
)
1−
zˆ− τ(1−)(1+g)(1+α)(1+r)
]
1 + τ(1−)
2(1+g)
(1+α)(1+r)
[
zˆ− τ(1−)(1+g)(1+α)(1+r)
] < 0. (14)
A child allowance decreases the human capital growth rate. In addition, this paper presents an exami-
nation of whether child allowances can raise fertility or not. From total differentiation of (11)–(13) with
respect to qˆ, γ, g, and n at the approximation of qˆ = 0, the effects of a child allowance on fertility are
given as
dn
dqˆ
=
n
[
1− 1−1+α
(
1 + τzˆ
1+g
1+r
)]
zˆ − (1−)1+α τ(1+g)1+r
. (15)
7The right hand side of (12) is zero at θ = 0 and infinity at θ = 1− τ − γ. Therefore, we have 0 < θ < 1 to hold (12) as
the intersect of the left hand side and the right hand side of (12).
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Without a pension system (τ = 0), child allowances can always raise fertility. However, in a pay-as-
you-go pension system, the child allowance cannot always raise fertility. Now, 1 + g depends on the level
of θ and 1 + g increases with θ as shown by (12). Defining θ∗ as θ to hold 1 = 1−1+α
(
1 + τzˆ
1+g
1+r
)
, θ < θ∗
brings about dndqˆ > 0.
8 Then, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 1 Child allowances always decrease the human capital growth rate. In contrast, child
allowances increase fertility if public education investment is low.
As shown by (15), without a pay-as-you-go pension, child allowances invariably increase fertility. In
an economy with a pay-as-you-go pension system, however, fertility cannot always increase. A decrease in
the income growth rate reduces the pension benefit. A decline in the pension benefit reduces household
income and decreases fertility. If public education investment is maintained at a high level, then the
income growth rate decreases greatly. Consequently, the negative effects of the decrease in a household’s
income on fertility are large. As shown by (14), child allowance reduces the income growth rate. Child
allowance increases the relative cost of private education. If public education level is high, that is vt is
large, marginal decrease in human capital accumulation brought about by a decrease in private education
is large. Therefore, large level of public education reduces the fertility.
Zhang (1997) derives the only result dndqˆ > 0. On the other hand, Fanti and Gori (2009) derives
dn
dqˆ > 0.
However, Yasuoka and Miyake (2014) derives the both positive and negative sign of dndqˆ , depending on
the pension benefit level. This paper derives the both positive and negative sign of dndqˆ . However, if τ
increases, θ∗ decreases. That is, the range of θ to hold dndqˆ > 0 becomes narrow. The result show that
both the contribution rate τ and public education level are high, it is hardly to hold dndqˆ .
3.2 Subsidy for Education
Next we discuss how a subsidy for education affects fertility and human capital accumulation. If the
government subsidises education investment, then the government budget constraint (8) becomes γwht =
xetn, i.e.,
γ =

1− 
xzˆ
1− xn. (16)
Then, the human-capital growth rate and fertility are expressed as
1 + g =
βw
1− 
(
zˆ
1− x
) [
θ(1 + α)
zˆ − 1−1+α τ(1+g)1+r
1− τ − θ − γ
]1−
, (17)
8Because 1 + g is monotonic increasing function about θ, there exists θ∗ to hold 1 = 1−
1+α
(
1 + τ
zˆ
1+g
1+r
)
= 0.
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n =
1− 
1 + α
1− τ − θ − γ
zˆ − 1−1+α τ(1+g)1+r
. (18)
We examine the effects of a subsidy for education on the human-capital growth rate and fertility.
Substituting (16) into (17) and (18), and total differentiation of (16) and (17) with respect to x and g at
the approximation of x = 0, it is apparent that this subsidy raises the human capital growth rate because
of
dg
dx
=
(1 + g)
(
1 + zˆn1−τ−θ
)
1−
τ(1−)(1+g)
1+r
zˆ+
τ(1+g)
1+r
> 0. (19)
Total differentiation of (16)–(18) with respect to x, n, and g at the approximation of x = 0 gives the
effects of a subsidy for education as
dn
dx
=
n
1+α
[
τ(1−)(1+g)
1+r − zˆ
]
zˆ − (1−)1+α τ(1+g)1+r
. (20)
Without a pension system, the subsidy for education investment reduces fertility. However, the pension
system brings about dndx > 0. Defining θ
∗∗ as θ to hold τ(1−)(1+g)1+r = zˆ and given θ
∗∗ < θ, it is obtained
that dndx > 0. Therefore, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 2 A subsidy for education investment can always raise the human-capital growth rate. In
addition, this subsidy can raise fertility if public education investment is high.
A subsidy for education investment entails a tax burden, which reduces the household disposable
income. Then, fertility decreases. However, if public education investment is high, then an increase
in education investment raises the pension benefit to a great degree. Therefore, the household income
increases. Fertility also increases.
Using a brief calculation, one obtains θ∗∗ < θ∗. If θ < θ∗∗, then only child allowances can raise
fertility. In the case where θ∗∗ < θ < θ∗, both child allowances and the subsidy for education investment
can raise fertility. Moreover if θ∗ < θ, then only the subsidy for education investment can raise fertility.
In fact, the effects of child allowances and the subsidy for private education investment in fertility are
changed by the extent of public education investment.
Zhang (1997) derives the result of dndx < 0. However, Yasuoka and Miyake (2014) and this paper
derives both positive and negative sign of dndx . Being different from Yasuoka and Miyake (2014), we
consider public education investment and therefore we derives the something new results. If τ increases,
θ∗∗ decreases. That is, the effect of the policy on the fertility depends on not only θ but also τ . If the
pension benefit level is small, the public investment level must be high to hold θ∗∗ < θ.
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Now, to discuss about the policy implications, we consider the public education as compulsory educa-
tion (elementary school, high school and others) and the private education as higher education (university
and others.)
[Insert Table 1 around here.]
Sweden and France are considered as the countries that can increase the fertility thanks to the policy.
In these countries, pension benefit and public education are high level. In addition, the education cost
for university is low, as shown by Table 1. This shows high τ , vt and x. Then, in real the fertility is
pulled up by the education subsidy policy in Sweden and France.
On the other hand, Japan is considered as the country that can not increase the fertility because of
the child care policy. However, the pension benefit and public education investment are low in Japan. In
addition, the education subsidy for university is low compared with the other countries. This shows low
τ , vt amd x. Therefore, θ∗∗ in Japan is larger than the one in Sweden and France. Then, the fertility
does not increases.
4 Social Welfare and Policies
This subsection presents consideration of the manner in which the policies affect social welfare assumed
by the following equation:9
W =
∞∑
s=0
ρsut+s,
=
1
1− ρ lnn+
α
1− ρ ln ct+1 +
1 + αρ
(1− ρ)2 ln(1 + g) +
1
1− ρ lnht. (21)
Here, ρ denotes the discount factor of each generation’s utility (0 < ρ < 1).
4.1 Child Allowance
First, we examines the effect of child allowance on the welfare. We obtain the condition of dWdqˆ > 0 as
dW
dqˆ
=
[
1− (1 + αρ)(1− )
(1− ρ)(1 + α)
]
dn
dqˆ
− αn
(1 + α)zˆ
+
n(1 + αρ)
(1− ρ)(1 + α)zˆ > 0. (22)
With ρ < α+1+2α−α , the condition to raise social welfare by child allowances is given by,
dn
dqˆ
> −α+ − (1− )αρ
(1 + α)(1− )
n
zˆ
. (23)
9Social welfare function is derived to sum each generation’s utility. However, (23) does not include the utility of the older
generation at t period. If one considers the utility of the older generation at t, then the social welfare function changes to
W =
∑∞
s=0
ρsut+s + α ln ct. Noting that no child care policy exists at the t− 1 period, we obtain ct = αzˆ(1+r)wht−11− nt−1
because of (4) and (5). nt−1 and ht−1 are unaffected by child care policy. Therefore, we can omit this term in considering
the effect of child care policy on social welfare.
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If child allowance can raise the fertility, the social welfare can be pulled up, too, because the fight hand
side of (24) is negative. On the other hand, If ρ > α+1+2α−α , that is, the discount for the future generation’s
utility is small, the condition to raise social welfare is given by,
dn
dqˆ
< −α+ − (1− )αρ
(1 + α)(1− )
n
zˆ
. (24)
Then, as long as dndqˆ > 0, the social welfare can not be pulled up by the child allowance.
4.2 Subsidy for Education
Second, we examine the effect of the subsidy for private education on the social welfare. We obtain the
condition for dWdx > 0 as
dW
dx
=
α+ − (1 + 2α− α)ρ
n
dn
dx
+ (1 + αρ) > 0. (25)
With ρ < α+1+2α−α , social welfare increases if
dn
dx
> − n(1 + αρ)
α+ − (1 + 2α− α)ρ , (26)
The right hand side of (26) is negative. Then, if dndx > 0, the social welfare can be pulled up. If
ρ > α+1+2α−α , the condition to raise the social welfare is given by
dn
dx
< − (1 + αρ)n
α+ − (1 + 2α− α)ρ . (27)
The right hand side of (27) is positive. Even if the subsidy for education investment can be pulled up
the fertility, the social welfare can not be always pulled up. If dndx is positive large value, this inequality
(27) is not held.
Then, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 3 With ρ < α+1+2α−α , that is, the discount rate for future generation’s utility is large, the
social welfare can be increased by both child allowance and subsidy for education when child allowance
and subsidy for education can increase the fertility.
If the discount rate for future generation’s utility is large, the inter-generational redistribution through
the pay-as-you-go pension can increases the social welfare because the inter-generational redistribution
can raise the present generation’s utility instead of a decrease in the future generation’s utility. Because
of discount rate is large, the positive effect on the present generation’s utility dominates the negative
effect on the future generation’s utility. An increase in fertility brought about by the policy raises the
pay-as-you-go pension benefit. An increase in the fertility brought about by the policy financed by the
taxation is substantial same with inter-generational distribution.
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5 Concluding Remarks
This paper presents consideration of two child-care policies: one is for child allowances, which are provided
for the quantity of children; the other is for subsidies for private education investment, which are provided
for the quality of children. This discussion presents an examination of how child-care policies affect
fertility and education investment. Although child allowances decrease private education investment
and the income growth rate, they can increase fertility if the public education investment is small. In
contrast, the subsidies for private education investment can always increase education investment and
the income growth rate. This subsidy can increase fertility when public education investment is large.
These results demonstrate that the policy to increase fertility should be chosen based on the extent of the
public education investment. Using this model setting, it was possible to explain the conflicting results
obtained by related studies.
Moreover, this paper presents an examination of whether child allowances and the subsidy for educa-
tion investment can increase the pension benefit and social welfare or not. Child allowances can increase
the pension benefit as long as fertility is low. However, the subsidy for education investment can increase
the pension benefit by virtue of an increase in income growth even if the subsidy decreases fertility.
In addition, this manuscript presents an examination of whether these policies increase social welfare
or not. If the future generation’s utility is not greatly discounted and fertility is pulled up by child
allowances, then child allowances cannot increase social welfare. However, the subsidy for education
investment can increase social welfare even if the future generation’s utility is not greatly discounted.
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Appendix
Optimal Allocations
We set the following Lagrange equation as follows,
L = lnnt +  ln et + lnβ + (1− ) ln vt + α ln ct+1
+ λ
(
(1− γ − τ − θ)wht + Pt+11 + r − (zt − qt)nt − (1− x)etnt −
ct+1
1 + r
)
, (28)
where λ denotes Lagrange multiplier. We obtain the following equations,
∂L
∂nt
= 0,
1
λ
= (zt − qt + (1− x)et)nt, (29)
∂L
∂et
= 0,

et
= (1− x)λnt, (30)
∂L
∂ct+1
= 0,
α
ct+1
=
λ
1 + r
, (31)
∂L
∂λ
= 0, (1− γ − τ − θ)wht + Pt+11 + r − (zt − qt)nt − (1− x)etnt −
ct+1
1 + r
= 0. (32)
Then, we obtain 1λ =
1
1+α
(
(1− γ − τ − θ)wht + Pt+11+r
)
and the optimal allocations (4)-(6).
Social Welfare Function
The social welfare function (21) are derived as follows,
W = lnn+ lnht+1 + α ln ct+1 + ρ (lnn+ lnht+2 + α ln ct+2) + · · ·
= (1 + ρ+ ρ2 + · · ·) lnn+ (1 + ρ+ ρ2 + · · ·) lnht + α(1 + ρ+ ρ2 + · · ·) ln ct+1
+ (1 + 2ρ+ 3ρ2 + · · ·) ln(1 + g) + α(ρ+ 2ρ2 + 3ρ3 + · · ·) ln(1 + g)
=
1
1− ρ lnn+
α
1− ρ ln ct+1 +
1 + αρ
(1− ρ)2 ln(1 + g) +
1
1− ρ lnht.
Considering (4) and (5), we obtain ct+1 =
α(1+r)(zˆ−qˆ)whtn
1− , and then we can examine the effect of policies
on the social welfare.
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Fig. 1: Total Fertility Rate, Fiscal Support for a Family and Public Education Investment.
(Data: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan (2015) White Paper on Birthrate-Declining Society (in
Japanese), OECD Social Expenditure Database (September 2014), OECD Education at a Glance 2014.
Data years are the following: Data years of the total fertility rate are for 2013. Data of fiscal support
for families are for 2011. Fiscal Support for Families includes in-kind benefits (day care, home help and
other in-kind benefits) and cash benefits (family allowance, maternity and parental leave, and other cash
benefits). Data of public education are those for 2011. The bracketed value represents fertility in each
country in 2013.)
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(i) (ii) (iii)
Sweden 3.9 1.9 56%
France 3.6 1.2 68%
Japan 2.7 0.8 40%
(i) All Primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary
(ii) All tertiary
(iii) Replacement of pension benefit (the ratio to pre-retirement earnings at 2014)
Table 1 Total public expenditure on education (2012)
(Data: OECD (2015) Education at a Glance, OECD Data Net Pensin Relpacement Rate.)
16
